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8.1 Introduction
Health, wealth, and where one lives are important, if not the three most
important material living conditions. This paper investigates the joint evo-
lution of these three conditions. The elderly reach their early postretire-
ment years in an initial status that is characterized by housing wealth, non-
housing bequeathable wealth, annuity income, health status, and family
connections. The broad goal of this paper is to describe the trajectories of
health, wealth, and living arrangements in older age that start from this ini-
tial state; to understand how the trajectories of health status, wealth posi-
tion, and living arrangements are interrelated with each other; and to be
able to predict how health and living arrangements will evolve when eco-
nomic and other conditions change.
Projecting the trajectories of health, wealth, and living arrangements
into the future is not a trivial task. Simple cross-sectional statistics may
lead one astray. For instance, we ﬁnd in cross-section data an increasing
propensity for elderly individuals to live with others, especially their chil-
dren (Börsch-Supan 1988, 1990; Ellwood and Kane 1990; Wolf 1995). But
the living arrangements of the oldest may not be a good prediction of the
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Association (GDV).living arrangement of those just entering their postretirement years. Be-
cause of diﬀerences in the economic resources of the cohorts, the younger
cohorts are likely to reach the oldest ages with more resources, and, as-
suming that living alone is a superior good, they will have a greater propen-
sity to live alone (Börsch-Supan, Kotlikoﬀ, and Morris 1991; McGarry
and Schoeni 1998). Furthermore, the observed age proﬁles of living ar-
rangements are not followed by any person or couple: because the poor-
est in a cohort die sooner than the better oﬀ, the average value of wealth,
health, or housing of a cohort will increase with age even in the absence of
any systematic change at the individual or household level.
Yet understanding the age path and determinants of living arrangements
is important both from a social point of view and from a scientiﬁc point of
view. For example, as shown in table 8.1, living with other family members
is a substantial economic resource that is frequently ignored in assessing
the economic well-being of the oldest old (Cox and Raines 1985; Kotlikoﬀ
and Morris 1989; Sloan and Shayne 1993; Grad 1994). This is evidenced,
for example, by a much lower poverty rate of elderly widows living with
other family members as compared to the poverty rate of widows in the
general population.
The frail elderly receive care when living with others, either with a spouse
or with children, that can substitute for market-purchased care or for long-
term care provided thought public programs such as Medicaid (Wolf 1984,
1994; McGarry and Schoeni 1998). There is even some suggestion that liv-
ing arrangements aﬀect the health of the elderly person: apparently being
cared for in the home of a family member is better for health outcomes
than institutionally provided long-term care (Moon 1983; Horowitz 1985;
Stone, Caﬀerata, and Sangl 1987).
From a scientiﬁc point of view, the main model of consumption and sav-
ing by the elderly, the life-cycle model, is incomplete if it does not recognize
the additional resources that may be transferred through joint living (Hurd
1990). For example, it is plausible that the magnitude of such transfers is
greater than measured cash transfers to an independently living parent.
There are many other examples of close relationships among living
arrangements, health, and economic status. For instance, an unexpected
242 Florian Heiss, Michael D. Hurd, and Axel Börsch-Supan
Table 8.1 Poverty and living arrangements: Poverty rates (%)
Nonmarried women
Age range Couples Live with other family members Live with no family members
65–74 6 12 24
75–84 7 12 28
85 or over 10 10 31
Source: Grad, 1994.decline in wealth may trigger a transition to joint living to conserve re-
sources. A decline in health may cause a transition to joint living or into a
nursing home for the provision of care. The probability of either transition
would be modiﬁed by other important covariates. In the ﬁrst case, health
status could act through diﬀerences in life expectancy or need for care. In
the second case, economic status would be important because of the pos-
sibility of purchasing care in the market. In both cases the number and lo-
cation of children would be important as well as their sex and economic
status. For example, a well-to-do son may prefer to transfer cash for the
market purchase of services, whereas a daughter may prefer to provide the
services directly.
These examples suggest that living arrangements and well-being derived
from health and economic status are closely related and that their evolution
over the life course should be studied jointly. This is the aim of this paper.
We study the relationships among living arrangements, health, and eco-
nomic status using a microeconometric approach similar to what is known
as vector autoregressions (VARs) in the macroeconomics literature.
The economic determinants of living arrangements have had relatively
little research attention compared with other aspects of the well-being of
the oldest old. For example, the early analyses of the Study of Asset and
Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) did not explicitly consider
the choice of living arrangements (Henretta et al. 1997; Wolf, Freedman,
and Soldo 1997), although the importance of family care for elderly par-
ents was stressed in both articles.1 Because research on the economic de-
terminants of living arrangements is not well developed, we are not ade-
quately equipped to understand the decline in the propensity to coreside
with children that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Börsch-Supan
1990; Ellwood and Kane 1990; Kotlikoﬀ and Morris 1990; Wolf 1995;
Costa 1997). It is important to understand how this decrease came about
and whether it is related to changes in the economic circumstances of the
elderly. Speciﬁcally, we would like to understand whether the decrease is re-
lated to a change in family linkages or to the increase in Social Security
wealth and Medicare beneﬁts, as suggested by Wolf (1995), Costa (1997),
and McGarry and Schoeni (1998). This understanding would help to as-
sess the likely impact of future changes in the generosity of Social Security
and Medicare beneﬁts, as well as the potential impact of changes in the ex-
tent of family links when the members of the baby boom generation will
need to support their elderly parents.
We  also lack reliable knowledge of some fundamental facts. For ex-
ample, it is controversial whether the elderly downsize housing in old age
and extract equity for nonhousing consumption (Ai et al. 1990; Venti and
Wise 1990, 2001; Sheiner and Weil 1992). We do not know the quantitative
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1. Wolf (1994) provides an extensive survey of the literature.importance of the progression of care from living independently to core-
siding with children to living in a nursing home. We do not know whether
coresiding with children changes bequest behavior. The AHEAD data on
which this paper is based are well suited to start answering these questions.
Because many fundamental facts are still unclear, our research will pro-
ceed in steps. In this paper, we will begin with establishing a reliable ac-
count of how living arrangements, health, and economic status evolve as
the elderly age and proceed by linking these trajectories to observable co-
variates. In this sense, this paper is mainly descriptive, although it does use
multidimensional regression methods. It extends the analysis by Hurd,
McFadden, and Merrill (1998) by a third dimension—namely, living ar-
rangements—and applies a richer methodology. Further research will take
account of the considerable heterogeneity in our sample. Accounting for
the heterogeneity in order to properly isolate the eﬀects of economic and
other covariates will require more advanced econometric methods (e.g.,
the MPMNP model in Börsch-Supan et al. 1992 and the MIMIC model
in Börsch-Supan, McFadden, and Schnabel 1996). Once we have precise
estimates of the inﬂuence that these covariates exert on living arrange-
ments, health, and economic status, we can compare our estimated coeﬃ-
cients and predicted trajectories to those generated by leading behav-
ioral models. This will be the subject of further research.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 8.2 describes the AHEAD
data and presents some central descriptive statistics. Section 8.3 develops
our methodology to estimate transition probabilities based on relatively
simple ﬁrst-order Markov processes. Section 8.4 describes our estimation
results. Section 8.5 constructs and interprets predicted trajectories of
health, wealth, and living arrangements that start at age seventy and go
through age ninety. Section 8.6 focuses on a speciﬁc aspect of these trajec-
tories, the reduction in home ownership. Section 8.7 brieﬂy concludes.
8.2 Data
Our work is based on the ﬁrst four waves of AHEAD. This study is par-
ticularly well suited for the purposes of this paper because one module was
speciﬁcally designed to study living arrangements, intergenerational trans-
fers of both money and time help, and how they relate to health and eco-
nomic status.
The AHEAD survey is a biennial panel that is being collected by the Sur-
vey Research Center at the University of Michigan. It is now a part of the
U.S. Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). The AHEAD study is nation-
ally representative of the cohorts born in 1923 or earlier with oversampling
of blacks, Hispanics, and Floridians. We will focus on age-eligible individ-
uals: that is, those persons from the cohorts of 1923 or earlier who were ap-
proximately aged seventy or older at baseline in 1993.
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of asset decumulation and health with the study of living arrangements of
the oldest old. In fact, AHEAD was speciﬁcally designed to enable a com-
prehensive understanding of how health and wealth status aﬀect the well-
being of the elderly as they age (Soldo et al. 1997). For instance, the
AHEAD survey has much more reliable measures of the wealth of the el-
derly than the data sets employed in previous analyses, plus more extensive
health information, and the AHEAD data identify in a better way family
links, in particular the economic resources of the children who, at some
point in the future, may coreside with the elderly person.
While the AHEAD data start with a sample of the noninstitutionalized,
the panel tracks the elderly when they enter a nursing home or similar in-
stitutions. We can observe asset changes at the time of this transition. The
AHEAD data supply information on changes in the economic status of
children and parents, together with changes in health and changes in hous-
ing and living arrangements. The AHEAD data contain a proxy interview
after the death of the respondent such that the living arrangement at the
time of death can be ascertained.
The AHEAD survey as well as the other cohorts in the HRS have cores
with questions in the following broad classes: employment (current and
former jobs); health measures, including self-assessed health, performance
measures, disease conditions, cognition, mood, and activity of daily living
(ADL) and instrumental activity of daily living (IADL) limitations; in-
come and assets; family structure and intergenerational transfers, of both
ﬁnancial help and time help; housing; insurance; and pensions.
In addition to the core content, the survey obtained a roster of the ex-
tended family including a number of characteristics of each child of the
AHEAD respondent. Of importance for this paper, the characteristics in-
clude education, income, home ownership, marital status, and parental
status. Children from the family roster were linked during the computer-
assisted interview to both ﬁnancial help and time help given to the
AHEAD respondent. This linkage will permit analyses of motivations for
transfers such as whether the less well-to-do child receives greater ﬁnancial
transfers from the AHEAD parent and if, in turn, that child provides
greater time help. Information about the beneﬁciaries of life insurance and
of wills was obtained. Anticipated bequests were measured by questions
about the subjective probability of giving a bequest and its magnitude.
Considerable information about housing was obtained at baseline includ-
ing adaptations of housing to disabilities. This is important since such
adaptations oﬀer an alternative to moving when health deteriorates.
The AHEAD survey contains a psychometric battery with questions
asking for subjective beliefs such as “Using any number from 0 to 100,
where 0 means that you think there is absolutely no chance and 100 means
that you think the event is absolutely sure to happen, what do you think are
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bers during the next ten years? . . . that you will receive major ﬁnancial help
from family members during the next ten years? . . . that you will move to
a nursing home over the next ﬁve years?” In a similar way, subjects who
were seventy to seventy-four years old at baseline were asked to give their
subjective survival probability to age eighty-ﬁve; subjects who were sev-
enty-ﬁve to seventy-nine were asked their survival probability to age ninety,
and so forth. These subjective survival probabilities are highly predictive of
mortality between waves 1 and 2 (Hurd and McFadden 1998).
As in all household-level data sets, the frequency of missing asset items
is fairly large in AHEAD. However, AHEAD (as well as HRS) made ex-
tensive use of bracketing techniques that converted nonresponses on asset
amounts to intervals by a series of questions about the range of the asset
amount (Smith 1997). Because the distribution of ﬁnancial assets in par-
ticular is highly skewed, these techniques are very valuable in reducing im-
putation error. We have spent considerable eﬀort developing and imple-
menting methods to impute missing asset items based on the brackets
(Hoynes, Hurd, and Chand 1997). The methods involve using bracket in-
formation and covariates in a way that conserves the multivariate distribu-
tion of assets and other characteristics. The construction of wealth quar-
tiles in this paper rests on this method.
In the ﬁrst AHEAD wave in 1993, 8,222 interviews were obtained. We
restrict our analysis to those individual who were born before 1924, ignor-
ing 779 younger spouses. In waves 2 (1995) through 4 (1999), no interview
could be obtained for 865 of the remaining respondents, leaving 6,578 for
our analysis. By wave 4, 2,508 (38 percent) of those respondents have died.
In total, 21,296 interviews (on average, 3.2 interviews per respondent) and
14,718 transitions (2.2 per respondent) are available for the analysis.
Table 8.2 shows descriptive statistics of the most important variables for
our study. The average age is eighty years, and between two waves 14.6 per-
cent of the respondents die on average. Sixty-two percent of the respon-
dents are female, reﬂecting the higher life expectancy. Forty-six percent of
the respondents are married—85 percent of the others are widowed, the
others are either divorced or never married. Seventy-two percent of the in-
terviewees own their home. Seventy-ﬁve percent live on their own, and 19
percent coreside with others—mostly with their children and/or grand-
children. Since in wave 1 only noninstitutionalized individuals were inter-
viewed, only respondents who move to nursing homes after that are fol-
lowed there. This results in only 4.3 percent of interviews in nursing homes.
The average respondent has 2.8 children, 1.4 of whom are female. On av-
erage, 1.9 of these children are married and 2.3 are single.
Figure 8.1 shows age paths of the most important variables of our anal-
ysis. They represent simple averages of these variables for the respondents
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Source: AHEAD, pooled waves 1–4.
Fig. 8.1 Age patterns in the four pooled cross sections 1993–99
Source: Pooled AHEAD waves 1–4.of the respective age in a pooled cross section of the AHEAD data, waves
1 through 4. Three eﬀects drive the shape of these curves. The ﬁrst is cohort
diﬀerences. The second eﬀect is the evolution of the variables over the life
course: older respondents report a worse health status and face a larger
threat of health condition incidents. The third eﬀect is diﬀerential mortal-
ity. It aﬀects the mean characteristics of the (surviving) respondents. This
third eﬀect seems to dominate the health measures for the very old: health
status and health condition prevalence are actually more favorable for the
(very few) centenarians than for those aged around ninety. The share of the
respondents in the highest wealth quartiles gradually decreases in the age,
whereas the rises of the share of the poorest quartile seems to be more pro-
nounced for those aged eighty-ﬁve and above. This is the same age group
for which the share of respondents living alone decreases dramatically and
both nursing homes and coresidence become important alternatives.
8.3 Estimation of the Transition Probabilities
Health, wealth, housing, and living arrangements are multidimensional
concepts. We analyze the joint evolution of the most important dimensions
of health, wealth, and living arrangements of elderly Americans. These di-
mensions are our state variables and comprise the following characteristics:
• Mortality
• Self-reported health status
• Prevalence and incidences of three major health conditions (heart
condition, stroke, cancer)
• Wealth quartile (sum of real and ﬁnancial wealth)
• Owner-occupancy
• Living arrangements (coresidence and nursing homes)
Table 8.3gives an overview of these state variables and their possible states.
The joint evolution of the state variables is presumably quite complex.
We chose a simple strategy to identify basic patterns. We do not aim at pre-
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Table 8.3 State variables
Variable State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
Mortality Alive Dead
Health condition prevalence Yes No
Health condition incidence Yes No
Health status Excellent/Very good Good Fair/Poor
Wealth quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Ownership Yes No
Living arrangement Alone With others Nursing homesenting a structural model and attach causal interpretations to our ﬁnd-
ings. Instead, we interpret our approach as a more sophisticated approach
to present descriptive evidence. The model can be interpreted like a VAR
common in macroeconometrics:
(1) yt   Ayt 1   Bxt,
where y is a vector of the state or left-hand-side variables detailed in table
8.3 and x represents a set of shift variables. We actually do not estimate a
linear relation since most variables in y are limited dependent in their na-
ture, but it helps to keep the macroeconomic counterpart in mind since our
approach shares the same fundamental properties and limitations.
More precisely, a given individual (whose subscript is omitted to ease the
notational burden) can assume (almost) each combination of states in table
8.3 at each point in time. Let at denote whether the individual is alive (at  
1) or not (at   0) at time t. Let y1t through y6t indicate the states of the other
variables from table 8.3 at time t. There are 2   2   3   4   2   3   288 combi-
nations of these other states. Let yt denote an indicator of the state deﬁned
as a combination of these six variables. Finally, call xt a vector of exoge-
nous variables such as age and sex. We are interested in understanding the
evolution of the states over time—that is, the probability of the event at  
a∗ and yt   y∗ given the history of yt and the explanatory variables xt. We
denote this probability by Pr(at a∗, yt y∗yt–1, yt–2, . . . , xt). It is the core
explanatory variable.
In this general formulation, it is infeasible to econometrically identify
this probability. We therefore have to impose restrictions. As a ﬁrst step, we
impose a ﬁrst-order Markov structure on our model:
(2) Pr(at   a∗, yt   y∗yt 1, yt 2, . . . , xt)   Pr(at   a∗, yt   y∗yt 1, xt)
This is quite restrictive and could be generalized somewhat. But since we
only have four waves of panel data, the dynamic structure that we can iden-
tify with these data is quite limited. A test of a more general structure such
as a second-order Markov model is planned in the future.
Secondly, the estimation of a 288   288 transition matrix is infeasible
with our data (and any other real-world data we can think of). We there-
fore impose structure on the joint dependencies. We choose a very simple
approach by assuming that the outcome probabilities of the state variables
are conditionally (on yt–1 and xt) independent. This allows us to write
(3) Pr(at   a∗, yt   y∗yt 1, xt) 
  Pr(at   a∗yt 1, xt)   Pr(y1t   y∗
1yt 1, xt, at   a∗) 
  Pr(y2t   y∗
2yt 1, xt, at   a∗)   ...     Pr(y6t   y6 ∗yt 1, xt, at   a∗)
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the diﬀerent state equations with the help of random eﬀects models similar
to Börsch-Supan and others (1992). However, this would increase the
computational burden substantially since no closed-form solutions for
the likelihood function can be derived for these nonlinear simultaneous
models.
In addition, we exploit several “natural” restrictions:
• Death is absorbing.
• Health conditions are absorbing: there is no transition from (health
conditions   yes) to (health conditions   no).
• Health conditions are preceded by health incidents: if (health condi-
tionst–1   no), then Prob(health conditionst   yes)   Prob(health in-
cidentt   yes).
Given this structure, the models for the diﬀerent state variables can be
estimated separately. Again, we choose a very convenient approach by as-
suming conditional independence over time, ignoring the panel structure
of our data. This simpliﬁes the analysis even more. In particular, we can
simply estimate our models conditional on the ﬁrst observation for each in-
dividual. We specify the separate models as binary logits (health condition
incidence, home ownership), ordered logits (health status, wealth quar-
tile), and multinomial logits (living arrangements). Obviously, not a full set
of 287 dummy variables for yt–1 is included in the regressions, but simpliﬁ-
cations are made. They are described in the following section, which pre-
sents our estimation results.
8.4 Estimation Results
Given the independent ﬁrst-order Markov structure, we can estimate
transition probabilities for the categorical variables in table 8.3 conditional
on lagged left-hand-side and socioeconomic variables. The results from
these regressions are shown in table 8.4. Except for the health incidence
equation, all equations feature a satisfactory ﬁt, and the signs of the esti-
mated coeﬃcients—where signiﬁcant—exhibit no surprises.
The ﬁrst column shows ordered logit estimates for a combined health
status/mortality regression. The dependent variable is coded as (1) excel-
lent/very good health, (2) good health, (3) poor/fair health, (4) deceased.
Not surprisingly, health deteriorates with increasing age. This eﬀect accel-
erates in old age, as the additional slope parameters of the age spline are
positive. Being female and being married increases self-reported health.
The prevalence of serious health conditions (heart condition, stroke, can-
cer) negatively aﬀects the self-reported health status. A health condition
incident since the previous wave dramatically increases mortality proba-
bilities and decreases the self-reported health status. Health status is

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.persistent over time in the sense that the reported health status in the pre-
vious wave is a strong predictor of mortality and current health status. In
this health regression, we do not use lagged living arrangements directly.
The reason for this is that living arrangements are driven by expectations
of future health, leading to a serious endogeneity problem in this regres-
sion. Instead, we instrument living arrangements in this regression with
detailed characteristics of children.
Many of the results of the health condition incidence regression are sim-
ilar to the health status/mortality regression. The age coeﬃcients are not
individually signiﬁcant, but a Wald test shows high joint signiﬁcance (W 
83.59a ~  2
[5]). Being in the lowest wealth quartile increases the probability
of suﬀering from a major health incident, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence between the three highest quartiles.
Respondents reporting a positive health status are more likely to be
wealthier in the next interview, but the health conditions we included in our
measure have no eﬀect on wealth. Marital status is an important determi-
nant of home ownership. Events like the death of the spouse and a major
health incident lead to a high number of people selling their home. But
variables like self-reported health status and wealth quartile also have im-
portant eﬀects. The age spline has a signiﬁcantly negative slope only for the
respondents aged seventy-ﬁve to eighty years. For the others, factors like
decreasing health seem to drive the further decrease of home ownership.
The results of the living arrangement regression show that living with
others and living in nursing homes are in fact substitutes in the sense that
the explanatory variables do have similar eﬀects on the probabilities to
choose one of these alternatives. Married couples tend to live alone until
one spouse dies. The surviving spouse is very likely to move either into a
child’s home or into a nursing home shortly afterward. Health condition
incidents also lead respondents to move in with somebody and—even
more so—to move into a nursing home. Similarly, poor or fair health sta-
tus leads to changes in this direction. Since most cohabitants are own chil-
dren, their characteristics obviously play an important role in explaining
cohabitation. Female children are more likely to live with their parents,
whereas married children and those who have children themselves are less
likely to do so.
8.5 Simulating Trajectories
According to equation (3), we can rebuild a full 289  289 transition ma-
trix of survival and the six other state variables yt for a given set of shift
variables xt. Starting from a suitably chosen initial state, we are thus able
to simulate predicted trajectories for our left-hand-side variables.
More speciﬁcally, we start these trajectories at age seventy and follow an
elderly person through age ninety. A particularly interesting date of obser-
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survival to age seventy. In the simulations, the estimated transition matri-
ces are interpreted as being valid for two-year transitions in accordance to
the biannual nature of the AHEAD data. This is important when inter-
preting the age variable.
The simulations are done in four steps:
1. Start at initial probabilities (typically 1 for one state, 0 for the others)
and a set of shift variables x for t   0.
2. Calculate the 289   289 transition matrix as described above.
3. Predict probabilities for t   1.
4. Repeat steps 2–3 until age ninety is reached.
We will perform several exercises. First, we predict whole system for
diﬀerent initial conditions, taking account of all (implicit) interactions.
Second, in subsections 8.5.1 through 8.5.3, we look at various dimensions
separately (like wealthy vs. poor, healthy vs. sick, etc.). For instance, how
does survival, how do living arrangements, change with initial health, with
initial wealth? Third, in subsection 8.5.4, we decompose the observed
eﬀects by leaving some of the left-hand-side variables at their starting val-
ues. This amounts to setting some oﬀ-diagonal elements in the transition
matrix to zero and therefore annihilates interaction eﬀects. Note that we
painfully avoid any notion of causality—these exercises should be inter-
preted as simulations of persons under diﬀerent circumstances and initial
conditions. Finally, in subsection 8.5.5, we simulate shocks such as the on-
set of a health condition and look at the resulting response pattern. This
last exercise is well known in the macroeconomics literature as “response
analysis.”
To warm up to our methodology, we start with ﬁgure 8.2, which shows
the trajectories of two very diﬀerent people. The top ﬁgure shows a poor
single person in bad health, while the bottom ﬁgure depicts a rich married
person in good health. Good health is deﬁned by a self-reported health sta-
tus of excellent or very good, bad health by a self-reported health status of
poor or fair. The rich person is in the highest wealth quartile, while the poor
person is in the lowest one. All other characteristics are identical. Both per-
sons are male, have no children, have no previous health conditions, and
live independently in an owner-occupied home.
The ﬁgure presents the evolution of our seven state variables, each rep-
resented by a line that starts at an initial probability and then moves from
that initial probability as the two people age. The ﬁrst ﬁve state variables
start at identical initial values for both persons. The solid line depicts the
survival probability, starting with 1 and declining with age. The small-
dotted line shows the probability of a health condition, starting with zero
and increasing with age. The line with triangles is the probability of home
ownership. It starts at 1 and declines with age. The line with circles repre-
254 Florian Heiss, Michael D. Hurd, and Axel Börsch-Supansents the probability of living with others, the thickest solid line living in a
nursing home. Both start at zero and increase with age. Finally, two state
variables start at diﬀerent values, namely wealth, represented by a large-
dotted line, and self-reported health, depicted by a line with squares.
Quite clearly, survival at age eighty is much higher (about 40 percent)
for the healthy, rich, and married person. The probability of ending up in
poverty is, as expected, also much lower. Note that the trajectories eventu-
ally converge. In the long run, we are all dead. Mathematically speaking,
the outcome of the Markov process will eventually be independent of the
initial state and converge on a state solely deﬁned by the transition matrix.
For a given age, this matrix depends on “shift” variables such as sex, the
number of children, and so on—that is, the xt in equation (2).
It is worthwhile to look at various details in ﬁgure 8.2 to understand
which mechanisms are picked up by our estimated transition probabilities.
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Fig. 8.2 Trajectories of two very diﬀerent peopleFor instance, it is noticeable that the probability of reaching the lowest
quartile in the wealth distribution increases again for the poorer person
past age eighty-four, which probably reﬂects nursing home costs—the
poorer single person of worse health has a much higher likelihood of living
in a nursing home than the richer married person of good health.
We now analyze the state variables separately and investigate their inter-
action with other state variables. Subsection 8.5.1 looks at survival and
health, subsection 8.5.2 at wealth and home ownership, and subsection
8.5.3 at living arrangements of the elderly.
8.5.1 Survival and Health
We begin with survival and relate it to initial wealth and initial health.
Figure 8.3 shows the probability of survival as a function of two initial
health characteristics, self-reported health (“would you rate your health as
fair/poor vs. excellent/very good”) and the existence of at least one previ-
ous serious health condition (“has a doctor ever told you . . .”), where seri-
ous conditions include heart problems, stroke, and cancer. The survival
curves remain essentially parallel whether such a condition exists or not,
while the eﬀect of the self-rated health assessment is strong, maybe mea-
suring other conditions, such as arthritis or diabetes, that are making life
diﬃcult without being immediately life threatening.
Figure 8.4 shows survival stratiﬁed by initial wealth. Survival at age
eighty, given survival until age seventy, is about 15 percent higher in the
highest wealth quartile as compared to the lowest wealth quartile. The bot-
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Fig. 8.3 Survival by health statustom part of the ﬁgure shows the interaction of wealth and health in deter-
mining survival, and the relative magnitudes of the eﬀects: survival, while
clearly dependent on initial wealth, is inﬂuenced much more strongly by
initial health.
Similar to survival, health is quite clearly inﬂuenced by initial economic
status. Figure 8.5 shows the evolution of two dimensions of health over
time, each stratiﬁed by whether the person is initially in the lowest or the
highest wealth quartile. The top part of the ﬁgure depicts self-reported
health, the bottom part the prevalence of a serious health condition. Being
wealthy decreases the likelihood of feeling in bad health by about 12 per-
centage points at age seventy-ﬁve relative to being in the lowest wealth
quartile. This wealth eﬀect is much smaller for an actual occurrence of a se-
rious health condition.
Health, Wealth, and Living Arrangements among the Oldest Old 257
Fig. 8.4 Survival by wealth quartile and its interaction with health8.5.2 Wealth and Home Ownership
We now turn to wealth and home ownership, starting with the latter.
Home ownership declines slowly but steadily as people age (see ﬁgure 8.6).
The decline in home ownership follows from the tendency of the system to
converge. Hence, its speed is the interesting observation, since this relates
to our regression estimates of section 8.4. Quite clearly, home ownership
declines much less for married elderly people than for single ones. It also
declines faster for the poor (more precisely, those with total wealth in the
lowest quartile) than for the rich (highest wealth quartile). We will investi-
gate this decline more closely in section 8.6.
The tendency of the system to converge is also clearly visible in ﬁgure
8.7, which depicts the evolution of wealth. The top part of this ﬁgure shows
a poor person (lowest wealth quartile) and the probability of staying in this
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Fig. 8.5 Health by lowest and highest wealth quartileFig. 8.6 Home ownership by wealth and marital status
Fig. 8.7 Wealth by living arrangementquartile. This probability declines, but increases again, most likely due to
nursing home costs. Figure 8.7 stratiﬁes this decline by initial living
arrangement. Staying in the poor quartile is most likely when an elderly
person lives in a nursing home, and least likely when this person lives with
others.2 The bottom part of ﬁgure 8.7 shows the reversed patterns as it
looks at the probability of staying in the highest wealth quartile. For the
initially wealthy, living with others decreases the expected future wealth
relative to living alone. This is consistent with the notion that cohabitation
implies intrafamily transfers to the needy.
8.5.3 Living Arrangements
We now turn to the main topic of this paper—namely, living arrange-
ments. We distinguish three living arrangements: living alone (or as a
couple), living with others (mainly with adult children), and living in a
nursing home. Figure 8.8 depicts the probability of the ﬁrst two living ar-
rangements and shows the eﬀect of additional children, in this case three
daughters. Figure 8.9 adds the probability of living in a nursing home. The
ﬁgures compare a single male, who has no previous health conditions, who
rates his health as fair or poor, who is in the lowest wealth quartile, and who
has one son with a similar male who has, in addition, three daughters.
Having daughters substantially decreases the probability of being alone
at age eighty (by about 20 percent) and living in a nursing home (by about
10 percent) in favor of living with others—that is, being taken in by one of
the daughters (by almost 30 percent). Interesting is the gender-speciﬁc
eﬀect of additional children. As shown in many other papers, daughters re-
duce the likelihood of living in a nursing home substantially more than
sons (see ﬁgure 8.9).
8.5.4 Decomposing the Eﬀects: Keep Some Dimensions Fixed
The next experiment separates direct and indirect eﬀects. In the previous
simulations, all left-hand-side variables in equation (1) were predicted us-
ing the full transition matrix. Now we hold certain dimensions constant.
As an example, we show the evolution of the survival probabilities (ﬁgure
8.10) and the probability of being in the highest wealth quartile (ﬁgure
8.11). The ﬁgures show how the interaction eﬀects in the full model
dampen the eﬀects that would be predicted without the interactions.
We begin with the survival probabilities in ﬁgure 8.10. The solid line
shows the trajectory using the full model with all interactions. In all other
lines, the occurrence of a serious health condition is ﬁxed at “no occur-
rence.” This shifts, as expected, the survival probabilities up (light-dotted
line). If we also assume that self-reported health stays ﬁxed at “excellent or
260 Florian Heiss, Michael D. Hurd, and Axel Börsch-Supan
2. Remember that this ﬁnding should not be interpreted in a causal fashion: we only know
that the two processes (wealth decumulation and where to live) are correlated, not which pro-
cess causes which other process to change.Fig. 8.8 Probability of living alone or with another person in the community
Fig. 8.9 Probability of living in a nursing homevery good,” survival rates stay very high and decline only slowly (dark-
dotted line). Fixing self-reported health at a “poor or fair” level, of course,
creates the opposite eﬀect (thick solid line).
Figure 8.11 performs a similar exercise with the probability of being in
the highest wealth quartile. The solid and the light-dotted lines show initial
trajectories using the full model with all interactions. The solid line starts
with a healthy individual (self-rated health “excellent or very good”), the
light-dotted one with an unhealthy elderly individual (self-rated health
“poor or fair”). Note that the two lines eventually merge—there is no long-
262 Florian Heiss, Michael D. Hurd, and Axel Börsch-Supan
Fig. 8.10 Decomposing survival probabilities by health eﬀects
Fig. 8.11 Decomposing the probability of being wealthyrun eﬀect of health on wealth, although at age seventy-ﬁve the probability
of being in the highest wealth quartile is substantially higher for the ini-
tially healthy individual.
If we now keep the initial health status ﬁxed (thick-dotted and thick solid
lines), the trajectories stay apart. The probability of staying in the highest
wealth quartile is about 15 percent higher for the elderly individual, who
stays healthy through age ninety.
8.5.5 Dose and Response Analysis
Finally, we look at the behavior of the multidimensional system in re-
sponse to shocks. Figure 8.12depicts the survival probability after a health
shock (“doctor told person about one of the following three conditions:
heart problem, onset of cancer, or stroke”). We compare this thick solid
trajectory to the one generated by the full model (with all interactions,
solid line) and to two variants in which the health condition is kept ﬁxed,
as we did in the previous subsection. We ﬁx it at “no conditions” (light-
dotted line) and at “some conditions exist at the age of seventy, but no fur-
ther incidents occur” (thick-dotted line).
Figure 8.12 shows that the survival probabilities in the aftermath of a
health shock follow pretty much the long run paths. There are no over-
shooting or other complex dynamic eﬀects. This is quite diﬀerent for the
self-reported health status; see ﬁgure 8.13. We apply the same shock but fo-
cus on self-reported health as outcome variable. The thick solid line depicts
the typical “overshooting” after a shock vis-à-vis the trajectory where this
condition has happened in the past. After a while, the health status per-
ception variable returns approximately to the long-run path.
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Fig. 8.12 Survival probabilities in response to a health shockPart of this eﬀect, however, is a selection eﬀect due to diﬀerential mor-
tality. If we also keep the survival variable ﬁxed at probability one (see the
line with circles in ﬁgure 8.13), subjective health stays worse for a long time
past the occurrence of the shock for those who actually survive.
8.6 Do the Elderly Downsize Housing?
In the preceding section, we found that home ownership decreases with
age. We noted that the Markov process has the built-in property of con-
vergence; hence, declining home ownership is, to some extent, an artifact
built into the model. We did, however, detect some signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the speed of decline depending on the initial characteristics of the eld-
erly person. This suggests that there are elderly in our sample who system-
atically decumulate housing. This section looks closer at the issue of home
ownership. We note that ownership is somewhat diﬀerent from housing
equity, which can be inﬂuenced by mortgage repayment, housing price
changes, or neglect of maintenance. Venti and Wise (1990, 2001) found
that in general the elderly to not reduce home equity except at the death of
a spouse.
Table 8.5 shows cross-section housing and living arrangements by age
bands. About 82 percent of those seventy to seventy-four years old were
owners, and most of them lived “alone,” either with a spouse only or singly.
The table shows a slow but accelerating decline in ownership with age and
a corresponding increase in renting, although until age eighty-ﬁve or over
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Fig. 8.13 Self-rated health in response to a health shockthe increase is small. Most notable in the table is the increase in “other,”
which includes neither renting nor owning (mostly living with children in
their house) and living in a nursing home, especially at age eighty-ﬁve or
over.
Because of diﬀerential mortality we would expect a greater decline in
owning in panel than we see in cross section, although cohort diﬀerences
could obscure this decline.
Table 8.6has cross-section housing and living arrangements for married
persons. The patterns are similar to the patterns in table 8.5, but there is a
much slower reduction in ownership with age. By age eighty-ﬁve or over the
ownership rate is 13 percentage points lower than at seventy to seventy-
four, whereas in table 8.5 it is 24 percentage points lower. In the oldest
group about 7 percent live in a nursing home.
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Table 8.5 Home ownership and living arrangements, percent distribution
70–74 75–79 80–84 85 
Own home 81.6 77.2 70.7 57.6
Alone 66.4 64.0 57.3 43.1
With others 14.7 12.1 11.5 9.0
Nursing home 0.5 1.1 1.9 5.5
Rent home 14.0 16.3 18.1 22.2
Alone 11.1 13.7 15.7 18.7
With others 2.9 2.6 2.4 3.5
Neither own nor rent 4.3 6.0 9.5 13.1
Not own, nursing home 0.2 0.6 1.8 7.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 4,099 7,157 5,427 4,535
Source: AHEAD pooled cross-sections (four waves).
Table 8.6 Home ownership and living arrangements, percent distribution: Married
70–74 75–79 80–84 85 
Own home 90.4 88.6 85.5 77.1
Alone 76.7 77.8 75.3 67.1
With others 13.3 10.2 8.8 5.9
Nursing home 0.4 0.6 1.4 4.1
Rent home 7.7 8.6 10.0 14.0
Alone 6.5 7.2 9.2 13.2
With others 1.2 1.4 0.8 0.8
Neither own nor rent 1.9 2.5 4.2 5.8
Not own, nursing home 0.0 0.2 0.4 3.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 2,555 3,733 2,238 1,232
Source: AHEAD pooled cross-sections (four waves).Table 8.7has similar results for singles. The levels of ownership are lower
and decline at a greater rate with age. By age eighty-ﬁve or over 14.5 per-
cent live in nursing homes and 15.9 percent neither own nor rent.
Figure 8.14 has the average ownership rates by cohort. For example, ap-
proximately 75 percent of the cohort of birth years 1919–23 owned a house
in wave 1 of AHEAD (when the cohort was approximately seventy-seven),
and the ownership rate of the cohort declined to 69 percent when the co-
hort was about eighty-four in 2000. The ﬁgure shows that cohort diﬀer-
ences are relatively minor: holding age constant, cohort ownership rates
are approximately the same.3 The cohort comparisons include diﬀerential
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Table 8.7 Home ownership and living arrangements, percent distribution: Singles
70–74 75–79 80–84 85 
Own home 66.8 64.7 60.1 50.3
Alone 49.2 48.9 44.5 34.1
With others 17.0 14.2 13.4 10.2
Nursing home 0.6 1.6 2.2 6.0
Rent home 24.6 24.5 23.8 25.3
Alone 18.8 20.7 20.3 20.8
With others 5.8 3.8 3.5 4.5
Neither own nor rent 8.2 9.8 13.3 15.9
Not own, nursing home 0.5 1.0 2.8 8.5
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 1,544 3,420 3,178 3,298
Source: AHEAD pooled cross-sections (four waves).
Fig. 8.14 Home ownership rates in six cohorts: Percentages
Source: AHEAD pooled cross sections (four waves).
3. But the sample sizes are small in some cases.mortality, the tendency for renters to die sooner than owners. Diﬀerential
mortality causes average ownership to increase even if there is no reduction
in ownership in the panel.
Table 8.8 shows panel transitions among survivors. Among marrieds in
the youngest age group, there were very low rates of transition out of own-
ership, and some transitions into ownership. But the predominant ﬂow is
out because of high rates of ownership. The transition rate out of owner-
ship increases with age.
From the ﬂows the steady-state rate of ownership (the ownership rate
were the transition rates into and out of ownership to remain constant for






where T   (1 – P 00)/(1 – P 11), P 00 is the transition probability from not own-
ing to not owning, and P 11is the transition probability from owning to own-
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Table 8.8 Home ownership transition rates: Survivors only (%)
Ownership status
Marital transition Age Lagged ownership Number Own Not own
Married to married 70–74 Own 2,013 98.3 1.7
Not own 179 9.5 90.5
75–79 Own 2,142 97.0 3.0
Not own 259 11.2 88.8
80–84 Own 1,068 94.4 5.6
Not own 160 12.5 87.5
85  Own 419 93.8 6.2
Not own 114 10.5 89.5
Single to single 70–74 Own 929 94.6 5.4
Not own 449 8.9 91.1
75–79 Own 1,568 91.8 8.2
Not own 858 8.2 91.8
80–84 Own 1,201 90.0 10.0
Not own 762 4.2 95.8
85  Own 855 89.0 11.0
Not own 817 5.4 94.6
Married to single 70–74 Own 146 93.2 6.8
Not own 34 8.8 91.2
75–79 Own 223 86.1 13.9
Not own 55 12.7 87.3
80–84 Own 155 85.2 14.8
Not own 44 0.0 100.0
85  Own 86 79.1 20.9
Not own 28 7.1 92.9
Source: AHEAD pooled cross-sections (four waves).ing. Among those married in both waves t and t   1 and in the age band
seventy to seventy-four the steady-state rate of ownership is 84.8 percent
and the actual average is 91.8 percent. Thus, there is a trend out of owner-
ship among marrieds, but the trend is slow. Among marrieds aged eighty-
ﬁve or over, the steady-state rate is 62.9 percent and the average is 78.6 per-
cent, also showing a downward trend in ownership.
Among those who were single in two adjacent waves the transition rate
out of ownership increases with age. The steady-state rates decline from
62.2 percent in the age band seventy to seventy-four to 32.9 percent in the
age band eighty-ﬁve or over.
Widowing is associated with considerably higher rates of transition out
of ownership: for example, among those aged seventy to seventy-four who
were widowed between adjacent waves the transition rate out of ownership
was 6.8 percent, compared with just 1.7 percent among surviving couples.
This rate increases sharply with age.
We ask whether the panel transitions can explain the cross-section pat-
terns of ownership that are in table 8.5. Figure 8.14 indicated that cohort
diﬀerences are not important, but we must still address diﬀerential mor-
tality. The average risk (holding age constant) of a renter’s dying compared
with an owner’s dying is about 1.39: said diﬀerently, the age-adjusted mor-
tality rate of renters is about 39 percent higher than the mortality rate of
owners. In that renters die more frequently than owners, the average rate of
ownership by a cohort will increase over time even if there are no transi-
tions into or out of ownership in panel among survivors. However, the rate
of ownership is high so that diﬀerential mortality will not increase the av-
erage ownership rate substantially as a cohort ages. Under the assumption
that owners and renters have the same mortality risk, the average over all
groups, the home ownership rate would decline by about 0.4 percent per
year more than the observed cohort rate. The diﬀerence is shown in ﬁgure
8.15: it shows the cross-section ownership rates averaged over four waves
of AHEAD data, the rates predicted from the panel ownership transitions
reported in table 8.8 (panel), and the rates predicted both from the panel
and from diﬀerential mortality (panel accounting for diﬀerential mortal-
ity).
The cumulative eﬀects of diﬀerential mortality can be seen by compar-
ing the two panel lines: after about ﬁfteen years the simulation that ac-
counts for diﬀerential mortality is about 5 percentage points above the
simulation that does not. The cross section is very closely matched by the
simulation that accounts for diﬀerential mortality showing that cohort
eﬀects are not very important and that the transition rates over the period
of our sample (mid- to late 1990s) have been stable for a considerable time.
The diﬀerence between the time paths of ownership by singles and by
couples and the eﬀects of widowing on ownership are shown in ﬁgure 8.16.
The top curve, for couples, and the bottom curve, for singles, are derived
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an ownership rate of 100 percent at age seventy. The curves are conditional
on survival and so have the interpretation of anticipated lifetime probabil-
ities of owning. Thus, if both members of a couple survive to ninety, the
probability of owning will decline to about 75 percent. Among singles who
are owners at age seventy the rate of decline is considerably greater, and the
probability of owning at age ninety less than 50 percent. The middle curve
shows predicted rates of ownership of couples who are owners at age sev-
enty, but where one spouse dies between seventy-eight and seventy-nine.
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Fig. 8.15 Ownership rates: Cross section and simulation
Source: Own computations based on AHEAD.
Fig. 8.16 Projected ownership rates
Source: Own computations based on AHEAD.During the one-year transition period to widowhood the probability of
owning declines sharply, as shown in table 8.4, and then the probability fol-
lows the path of singles but at a higher level.
The two curves at the bottom of ﬁgure 8.16 show the probability of males
and of females dying at each age conditional on reaching age seventy. The
most likely age for males to die is eighty-two, and it is eighty-eight for fe-
males. The ﬁgure suggests that 50–60 percent of couples who are owners at
age seventy will be owners at the death of the surviving spouse, and that a
somewhat lower fraction of singles will be owners. These percentages are
not much diﬀerent from the estimates of Sheiner and Weil (1992), who es-
timated that among couples who were owners at age sixty-ﬁve, just 41 per-
cent of the last survivor would die still owning.
The life-cycle model (LCM) predicts that wealth will be decumulated as
people age, and in ﬁgure 8.17 we compare the wealth paths predicted in
three diﬀerent ways with the rate of ownership among singles. The objec-
tive of the comparison is to ﬁnd whether the path of ownership as an indi-
cator of housing wealth is broadly consistent with wealth paths as pre-
dicted by the LCM. The ﬁrst wealth forecast (labeled wealth . . . SIPP) uses
observed wealth change in the 1984–85 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) panel. The second (labeled wealth . . . subjective
probabilities) is based on the subjective probability of bequests as elicited
in the HRS. Hurd and Smith (2002) compared them with actual bequeath-
able wealth to estimate annual rates of anticipated dissaving, which we use
to construct the curve. The third (labeled wealth . . . model) uses an LCM
estimated over the 1969–79 Retirement History Survey to predict the path
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Fig. 8.17 Home ownership and wealth
Source: Own computations based on AHEAD.of bequeathable wealth (Hurd 1989).4 The rates of decumulation of be-
queathable wealth are broadly consistent with each other. They predict
that a single person who survives into his or her nineties will have con-
sumed three-fourths or more of bequeathable wealth.
The path of home ownership initially follows the path of bequeathable
wealth, but after about ten years it is higher than all of them. The lower rate
of decline probably reﬂects a number of ways in which housing wealth is
treated diﬀerently from nonhousing wealth. There are substantial transac-
tion costs in moving from home ownership to renting, so that there will be
a tendency to retain housing beyond what would be optimal were adjust-
ment costless. People have a sentimental attachment to a particular house,
which increases the transaction costs. There is risk associated with renting,
such as inﬂation in rental costs, whereas, except for property tax and main-
tenance, owned housing is a way of purchasing a stream of real consump-
tion.
We can ﬁnd whether the increase with age in the rate transitions out of
owning is a pure age eﬀect or is associated with characteristics such as
health or economic circumstances. Our method is to estimate the proba-
bility of owning in wave t 1 as a function of characteristics and economic
circumstances as well as ownership status in wave t. Using four waves of
AHEAD, we have three transitions. Table 8.9 shows the ratio of the prob-
ability of owning to not owning (the risk of owning) of someone with one
of the characteristics displayed in the ﬁrst column divided by the risk of
owning of someone in the reference group. These results are estimated by
multivariate logit over the three transitions. Thus, someone who is married
has a risk of owning in wave t   1 that is 124 percent higher than the risk
of someone who is not married, and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at less than
the 0.001 level.
The covariates with substantial explanatory power and statistical signif-
icance are the death of a spouse, which reduces the likelihood of owning in
the next wave; the incidence of a health event; baseline health of fair or
poor; and measures of wealth, as well as ownership itself. Of note is that
age per se is not associated with an accelerating transition out of home
ownership. This implies that the increased transition rates by age band that
are in table 8.8 are due to worsening health and possibly reductions in
wealth that occur with age.
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4. We would like to use the AHEAD wealth data for this comparison, but two problems pre-
vent its use: stock ownership was apparently underreported by about 10 percentage points in
the 1993 wave, leading to a very large increase in measured wealth between 1993 and 1995
(Rohwedder, Haider, and Hurd 2004). There is no obvious way to correct for this data error.
The 1995 wave of AHEAD was followed by the stock market boom, leading to wealth in-
creases that were likely unanticipated and do not reﬂect planned life-cycle wealth accumula-
tion.We have included two wealth measures: housing wealth and nonhousing
wealth. For each we deﬁne three categories: the lowest wealth quartile, the
second and third quartiles, and the highest quartile. Both types of wealth
are associated with higher levels of ownership. That is, those with more
housing wealth and those with more nonhousing wealth tend to retain
ownership. We had anticipated that high housing wealth combined with
low nonhousing wealth would be associated with an elevated probability of
selling the home, but the four interactions were neither economically nor
statistically signiﬁcant.
In summary, we ﬁnd that home ownership is reduced with age but that
the rate of reduction is less than the rate of reduction of nonhousing
wealth. The lower rate of decline is likely due to a mixture of causes: hous-
ing may be held for a precautionary motive, as in Skinner (1996); it may be
held until health makes ownership infeasible, whereas health should not
aﬀect the ability to hold ﬁnancial wealth; and in that its sale is often asso-
ciated with widowing, as in Venti and Wise (2001), it may be used to cover
costs associated with widowing.
Some of these explanations are consistent with an LCM extended to in-
clude precautionary saving: poor health or a health event are predictors
of reduced life expectancy, which should accelerate the decumulation of
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Health condition 1.05 0.484
Health incident 0.68 0.000
Health good 0.99 0.936
Health fair/poor 0.79 0.006
Housing wealth quartile lowest 0.60 0.000
Quartile 2 and 3
Highest 1.19 0.063
Nonhousing wealth quartile lowest 0.87 0.094
Quartile 2 and 3
Highest 1.32 0.002
Home owner 101.67 0.000
Live with others 1.09 0.359
Nursing home 1.13 0.607
Source: Own computations based on AHEAD.wealth. However, the interaction of health with the requirements of home
ownership makes the study of ownership more complex than the study of
nonﬁnancial wealth.
8.7 Conclusions
This paper investigated the interaction among health, wealth, and where
elderly persons live. We reproduce the ﬁnding that wealth and health are
strongly related to each other. Wealthier persons live longer and are
healthy longer. This interaction is moderated by where elderly persons live.
Remaining in the lowest wealth quartile is most likely when an elderly per-
son lives in a nursing home and least likely when this person lives with oth-
ers. The reversed pattern is true for the probability of remaining in the high-
est wealth quartile. For the initially wealthy, living with others decreases
the expected future wealth relative to living alone. This is consistent with
the notion that cohabitation implies intrafamily transfers to the needy. For
those who remain living independently, home ownership declines, but the
speed of reduction is slower than we would expect for ﬁnancial wealth.
Results in this paper are descriptive and imply no causality. Further re-
search will apply more sophisticated econometric methods in order to
identify patterns of causality.
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Comment Steven F. Venti
Whether elderly persons live independently, live with others, or live in an
institution has important implications for their well-being. There seems
little doubt that the choice of living arrangements is closely related to the
past ﬁnancial resources and the health status of elderly persons. It is also
likely that living arrangements will have an eﬀect on future health and,
possibly, wealth as well. Disentangling the complicated relationships be-
tween these outcomes is a formidable task. This paper takes a modest ﬁrst
step by carefully describing the relationships among some of the key vari-
ables that aﬀect the well-being of the elderly without delving into the com-
plex problem of identifying causality.
The ﬁrst part of this paper describes how the “state” variables—health
(prevalence, incidence, and self-reported measures), wealth (four quar-
Health, Wealth, and Living Arrangements among the Oldest Old 275
Steven F. Venti is a professor of economics and the DeWalt Ankeny Professor of Economic
Policy at Dartmouth College, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.tiles), home ownership, living arrangements (alone, with other, nursing
home), and survival—evolve after retirement. This is done by estimating
ﬁrst-order transition probabilities among the state variables, controlling
for a set of exogenous variables. The authors are up-front about the limita-
tions of this procedure. There is no claim of causality in the estimated re-
lationships. The use of a ﬁrst-order process leads to a mechanical tendency
for the simulated age proﬁles to converge over time, so in many simulations
the rate of convergence is more important than the level at which simulated
proﬁles eventually converge. The ﬁrst-order assumption also imposes con-
ditional independence over time. Thus, for example, ownership in the cur-
rent period, but not length of tenure in an owned home (ownership in pre-
vious periods), aﬀects outcomes in the next period. The assumption also
implies that a health “shock” will only have a one-period direct eﬀect on
other outcomes, although indirect eﬀects may persist through eﬀects on
other state variables.
Despite these limitations, the estimates and simulated trajectories based
on the estimates provide a rich description of the relationship between the
state variables. Given the number of state and control variables, there are
almost an inﬁnite number of scenarios the authors could simulate. The key
scenarios of interest involve living arrangements—both the eﬀects of other
variables on living arrangements and how living arrangements aﬀect other
outcomes. The parameter estimates suggest strong persistence of living
arrangements: previous location strongly predicts current location. How-
ever, there are other signiﬁcant factors that can lessen this persistence.
Marriage is associated with higher rates of ownership and lower rates of
the other arrangements. Death of a spouse or a decline in health produces
the opposite result. Wealth is positively related to ownership but is unre-
lated to the likelihood of other living arrangements. None of this is much
of a surprise; it implies that healthy, wealthy persons with stable family
structures are more likely to own and to continue owning.
Sections 8.2 through 8.4 simulate the interactions between health,
wealth, and living arrangements by ﬁxing the control variables, setting ini-
tial values of state variables, and letting these state variables vary freely in
subsequent periods. Essentially, this procedure allows for complete inter-
action among the state variables. First is the age proﬁle of home ownership
by wealth. Elderly households with lower initial wealth discontinue own-
ership at a faster rate than elderly households with high initial wealth. It is
important to emphasize that state variables, such as the incidence of a
health problem or nursing home entry, are not held constant in the simu-
lated age proﬁle of ownership. Thus, low-initial-wealth households end up
with lower rates of ownership than high-initial-wealth households, but
other state variables may be indirectly responsible for the decline.
Another issue to keep in mind is that the parameter estimates are aver-
age eﬀects. A conditional logit of ownership in the current period on own-
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simulated age-proﬁle of ownership. This methodology yields the average
ownership proﬁle in the population. Of course, it may be that few individ-
uals behave like an “average” person, particularly when many of the state
variables, such as ownership, are discrete. Thus, the authors’ observation
that “home ownership declines slowly but steadily as people age” is a de-
scription of average behavior but not necessarily of individual behavior.
We will return to this point.
Another set of simulations considers the trajectory of wealth for house-
holds with diﬀerent initial living arrangements. Again, full interaction
among the state variables is allowed. Households initially in nursing homes
are more likely to remain poor, and households initially living with others
are least likely to remain poor. The probability of remaining poor for all
three living arrangements decreases from ages seventy to eighty-ﬁve and
then begins to rise. Perhaps a large fraction of initially poor households—
regardless of their initial living arrangement—eventually face the ﬁnancial
burden of nursing home costs. This peculiar result deserves further anal-
ysis.
Perhaps the most interesting results pertain to the eﬀect of the control
variables. As expected, marriage and home ownership are positively re-
lated. The sex composition of children is startlingly powerful. Having
daughters substantially increases the likelihood of living with others and
decreases the probability of other living arrangements.
To isolate the eﬀects of individual state variables, the authors ﬁx some of
the state variables at their initial values and let the others vary. The simu-
lations consider survival and wealth trajectories when some of the health
variables are ﬁxed. As expected, the probabilities of remaining alive and re-
maining in the highest wealth quartile are higher when persons are as-
sumed to remain healthy. This technique is useful to sort out the relation-
ships between the state variables, but unfortunately it is not applied to
either home ownership or living arrangements. A ﬁnal set of simulations
looks at the eﬀect of health shocks on age proﬁles for survival and self-
reported health status.
The second part of the paper shifts the focus to a more detailed analysis
of the decline in home ownership. This has been widely studied (Merrill
1984; Sheiner and Weil 1992; Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Venti and
Wise 1990, 2004; Megbolugbe, Sa-Adu, and Shilling [1997]), and the re-
sults are broadly consistent: households that experience shocks such as
death of a spouse, change in health, or nursing home entry have a higher
likelihood of discontinuing ownership. Elderly households that do not ex-
perience these shocks tend to stay put and may even increase home equity
on average. For example, Venti and Wise (2004), also using the AHEAD,
ﬁnd annual percentage declines in home equity (not ownership) of 0.1 per-
cent among continuing two-person households, 1.2 percent among con-
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suﬀer the death of a spouse or in which a member enters a nursing home.
Among all households combined, the decline in home equity is 1.8 percent
per year.
The results in this paper are broadly consistent with these ﬁndings. The
projected rate of home ownership for married couples declines from 100
percent to 75 percent between the ages of seventy and ninety, or about 1.4
percent per year. For continuously single households the projected annual
rate of decline is 3.4 percent. The overall rate of ownership decline for all
households is about 2.5 percent per year. These estimates are slightly
higher than the Venti-Wise estimates, but there are three important diﬀer-
ences. First, the Venti-Wise estimates pertain to home equity, so rising real
house prices as well as declining mortgage balances suggest that equity will
fall more slowly than ownership. Second, the studies also diﬀer in their
treatment of households in which a member entered a nursing home. These
households have a very high rate of exit from ownership. The Venti-Wise
estimates for one-person and two-person households exclude these nursing
home entrants and are expected to be lower. Finally, the changes in home
equity reported by Venti-Wise include not only the decline in home equity
among households that discontinue owning, but also the change in home
equity among initial owners who buy another home. On average, this lat-
ter group of owners “trades up,” thus oﬀsetting, in part, the decline in eq-
uity for households moving out of ownership. In light of these diﬀerences,
the authors’ overall rate of ownership decline for all households of about
2.5 percent per year is of comparable magnitude to the 1.8 percent per year
decline in home equity found by Venti and Wise. Interestingly, the logit es-
timates presented in table 8.9 show that signiﬁcant reductions are associ-
ated with death of a spouse and incidence of a health event (as well as ini-
tial housing and nonhousing wealth quartiles), but once these shocks are
accounted for, there is no tendency for ownership to decline with age.
Although the authors’ empirical results are consistent with prior ﬁnd-
ings, the interpretation of these results is not. The authors compare their
ﬁndings to the rate of decumulation predicted by the life-cycle model and
to observed rates of decumulation of nonhousing wealth. They hope to es-
tablish “whether the path of ownership as an indicator of housing wealth
is broadly consistent with wealth paths predicted by the LCM.” The au-
thors compare their ownership projections to wealth change in the 1984–
85 SIPP, to the subjective probability of bequests elicited in the HRS, and
to the predicted path of bequeathable wealth based on a life-cycle model
using data from the 1969–79 Retirement History Survey. The authors con-
clude that their results are “broadly consistent” with these wealth paths, al-
though it is clear that the decline in ownership in the AHEAD is less pro-
nounced than any of the three comparison wealth proﬁles.
I ﬁnd it odd that the authors compare the decline in home ownership ob-
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1984 SIPP and the 1969–79 Retirement History Survey. More recent data
are available for this comparison. The 1996 panel of the SIPP shows little
decline in nonhousing wealth through age eighty (authors’ estimates), and
the AHEAD shows dramatically increasing nonhousing wealth among the
older old (Hurd 2002). The authors are aware of the AHEAD results but
argue that “the 1995 wave of AHEAD was followed by the stock market
boom, leading to wealth increases that were likely unanticipated, and do
not reﬂect planned life-cycle wealth accumulation.”
The same reasoning can be used to argue that the decline in home own-
ership observed in the AHEAD does not reﬂect life-cycle motives. Most,
or perhaps all, of the decline in ownership is accounted for by changes in
health status or the death of a spouse. Elderly households that do not face
these shocks (likely unplanned and unanticipated) decumulate very little of
their housing wealth, if any. This suggests that most elderly persons desire
to continue owning their homes for as long as they can. In the absence of
shocks, housing wealth is not used to ﬁnance general consumption in re-
tirement, as implied by the LCM. This unwillingness to downsize may be
rooted in emotional and psychological attachment to homes, or it may re-
ﬂect the conscious decision to keep the house as a form of insurance
against catastrophic events. Survey evidence suggests that, with the pos-
sible exception of an end-of-life hospital stay, the members of most house-
holds plan, desire, and expect to die in their homes (American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons 2000). Their “plan” is not to decumulate housing
wealth, and, for the large fraction of the population that does not experi-
ence these events, the decline in ownership looks nothing like the proﬁle
predicted by the LCM. Of course, some fraction of the population experi-
ences some sort of shock, and these households decumulate dramatically.
Thus, as noted earlier, the “average” proﬁle may bear some resemblance to
a life-cycle path, but the experience of individual households does not.
Overall, this paper is a promising start to disentangling the complicated
relationship between health, wealth, and living arrangements. The rela-
tionships are so complicated that it is diﬃcult to even develop a methodol-
ogy to describe them in a systematic and coherent way. The vector auto-
regression structure used here does quite a good job. The initial results are
informative, although I yearn for more simulations of ownership and liv-
ing arrangements that hold ﬁxed other outcomes. Such simulations help to
isolate the eﬀects of these key state variables. I look forward to further
eﬀorts to extend this methodology.
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